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Ce texte porte sur l’évaluation du risque d’impartition des services
informatiques. Le risque est défini ici comme étant fonction d’événements
indésirables pouvant résulter d’une décision d’impartir, et des facteurs pouvant
mener à ces événements indésirables. La théorie des coûts de transaction et la
théorie de l’agence servent de base théorique à l’identification des principaux
facteurs de risque. Les événements indésirables sont identifiés à partir d’une
recension des écrits sur l’impartition des services informatiques.
Outsourcing decisions, and contractual arrangements of the type
required by an IT outsourcing deal, entail risks. This is not to say that outsourcing
is bad in itself. It only means that, as in other risky business ventures such as new
product development, capital investments, and IS projects, risk assessment and risk
management are important contributors to the success of an IT outsourcing
venture. This paper focuses on risk assessment. After providing a brief conceptual
definition of risk, the paper reviews the empirical literature in order to identify the
main undesirable outcomes that may result from an IT outsourcing deal. It then
uses transaction cost and agency theory as a primary theoretical basis, and
proposes a framework for categorizing risk factors which have been identified in
the literature. Finally, the paper discusses the dynamics of risk, by examining how
the various risk factors are linked to the undesirable outcomes.
Mots Clés : Sous-traitance des systèmes informatiques, théorie de l'agence,
économie des coûts de transaction
Keywords : Outsourcing of IS, agency theory, transaction cost economics
JEL : L23
11. Introduction
"To outsource or not ? "
Such was the title of an article published in 1992, in the International Journal of
Information Management [9]. Five years and numerous studies on IT outsourcing
later, the question is still relevant. Some argue that outsourcing IT leads to lower
costs, economies of scale, access to specialized resources, and new business ventures
[18,19]. Others, however, warn firms against the negative consequences that IT
outsourcing may have: escalating costs, diminishing service levels, loss of expertise,
and contract irreversibility, to name a few [13, 16, 22].
Outsourcing decisions, and contractual arrangements of the type required by an IT
outsourcing deal, do indeed entail risks. This is not to say that outsourcing is bad
in itself. It only means that, as in other risky business ventures such as new
product development, capital investments, and IS projects, risk assessment and
risk management are important contributors to the success of an IT outsourcing
venture [34 ].
This paper proposes a conceptual framework for risk assessment. After providing a
brief definition of risk, the paper reviews the empirical literature in order to
identify the main undesirable outcomes that may result from an IT outsourcing
deal. It then uses transaction cost and agency theory as a primary theoretical basis,
and proposes a framework for categorizing risk factors which have been identified
in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses the dynamics of risk, by examining
how the various risk factors are linked to the undesirable outcomes.
2. Risk defined
The notion of risk is pervasive to the business literature in general, and to the IS
literature in particular. However, the term often refers to two different concepts.
For instance, risk is sometimes used as a general expression that refers to negative
outcomes: shortfalls in systems performance, in the case of a software
development project [8], disruption of service to customer, in a business process
reengineering (BPR) context [35], and hidden costs or loss in innovative capacity,
in the case of IT outsourcing [13]. Other times, the term risk refers to the factors
leading to negative outcomes: continuing stream of requirement changes or
personnel shortfalls in a systems development context [8], lack of upper
management commitment, in BPR [34], and inexperienced staff or business
uncertainty when discussing IT outsourcing [13].
2In fact, the concept of risk encompasses these two components. Following Boehm
[8], risk is defined here as "the possibility of loss or injury", and is further
translated into the concept of risk exposure which is a function of the following:
RE = P(UO) * L(UO)
where RE is the risk exposure, P(UO) the probability of an undesirable outcome,
and L(UO) the loss due to the undesirable outcome [8, 27,40].
In any situation, several undesirable outcomes may occur. Among the examples
listed above, undesirable consequences would be: shortfalls in systems
performance, disruption of service to customers, hidden costs, and loss of
innovative capacity [25]. The loss due to a given undesirable outcome can be
approximated either via quantitative analysis (for instance, by evaluating the
amount of sales lost due to disruption of service to customers) or via qualitative
assessment of the organizational impact of each negative outcome (for instance, by
using Likert scales to assess the importance of the impact of the undesirable
outcome) [5, 35].
In certain circumstances, the probability of occurrence of an undesirable outcome
can be estimated on the basis of past performance characteristics of the object
under study [26], or subjective probabilities can be assessed [8]. However, in
several areas, probabilities are often difficult, if not impossible to assess on the
basis of past performance [5]. Consequently, several risk assessment methods
adopt the approach of approximating the probability of undesirable outcomes by
identifying and assessing factors that influence their occurrence [2, 5,7]. In a
software development context, for instance, Barki et al. [5] have identified such
factors, which belong to five broad categories: technological newness, application
size, software development team’s lack of expertise, application complexity, and
organizational environment. The degree to which each factor is present in a
software project will contribute to increase the probability of occurrence of an
undesirable outcome (here, project failure).
On the basis of this definition, risk assessment consists of the steps listed in Figure
1. Since all the risk factors do not give rise to all the undesirable outcomes, risk
assessment should also link risk factors to undesirable outcomes. For instance, in
the case of a software development project, the lack of project team knowledge
about the activity to be supported by the application under development is a risk
factor which is linked to the negative outcome of having a system that does not
adequately respond to user information needs [11]. Yet, this undesirable outcome
3is less likely to be closely linked to the risk factor defined as "shortfalls in
externally furnished components" [8].
Some of the activities of Figure 1 are generic to a given type of project or decision,
while others have to do with a particular project. Identifying the potential
undesirable outcomes, identifying the risk factors, and identifying the links
between risk factors and undesirable outcomes are generic activities. The literature
on IS project management, for instance, provides lists of undesirable outcomes and
risk factors [5]. What is specific to a particular project or decision is the evaluation
of the magnitude of the potential loss due to each negative outcome, and the
assessment of the importance of each risk factor.
1. Assess the loss due to undesirable outcomes:
• Identify the potential undesirable outcomes for a given project;
• Evaluate the magnitude of the potential loss due to each negative
outcome;
2. Assess the risk probability:
• Identify the risk factors that might lead to undesirable outcomes;
• Identify the links between risk factors and undesirable outcomes;
• Assess the extent to which each risk factor is present in the project.
Figure 1
Risk assessment procedure
This paper will focus on the three generic activities of risk assessment in the
particular context of IT outsourcing: identifying the potential undesirable
consequences of IT outsourcing, identifying the risk factors, and linking risk
factors to undesirable outcomes.
3. Undesirable outcomes of IT outsourcing
In their discussions of IT outsourcing, several authors, both from academia and
from practice, have identified undesirable consequences that might result from
such a venture. Three sources were particularly useful in this exercise since they
devote much attention to this dimension of outsourcing arrangements [4, 13, 22].
Since IT outsourcing is a typical example of a make-or-buy decision, industrial
organization literature was also used as a source for identifying negative
consequences of IT outsourcing. Table 1 synthesizes this literature review.
4The first group of undesirable consequences pertain to hidden costs, which are
sometimes said to be the biggest IT outsourcing problem [23]. Transition costs
include setup costs, redeployment costs, relocation costs, and parallel-running
costs, and so on. Management costs refer to the human resources that have to be
put into managing an outsourcing contract. According to Earl [13], companies
often underestimate these two types of costs, which can increase quite rapidly.
Cross [10], for instance, reports the experience of British Petroleum who, after
having outsourced its IT operations to several outsourcers, discovered that such
contracts "required far more management resources than they were worth [10,
p.94]. In a discussion about the cost-benefit aspects of the software acquisition
decision, Nelson et al. [30] identify another type of costs that could be added to the
transition and management costs mentioned by Earl. These are contracting costs,
that include the costs related to searching and evaluating the appropriate vendor,
benchmarking the services offered, specifying the legal terms of contracts,
negotiating contracts, and resolving disputes. Lacity and Hirschheim [22] and
Lacity et al. [23]identify another type of hidden costs, that is, those costs that the
client assumed were included in the contract, but which, in fact, were not. They
give the example of maintenance on personal computers, sales tax on equipment
purchases, rewiring for office moves, etc, which can add up to several hundred of
thousands, even millions, of dollars.
Table 1
Undesirable consequences of IT outsourcing
Hidden costs Hidden transition costs and management costs
[10, 13,30]
Hidden service costs [22, 23]
Contractual difficulties Costly contractual amendments [13]
Disputes and litigation [4, 22]
Difficulties in renegotiating contracts [22]
Lock-in [31]
Service debasement Diminished quality of service [4]
Increased costs of services [22]
Loss of organizational
competencies
Loss of IT expertise [12, 13, 22]
Loss of innovative capacity [13]
Loss of control of the activity [38]
Loss of competitive advantage [12, 13]
Contractual difficulties constitute another category of negative outcomes of
outsourcing. Contractual amendments are often necessary, either because the
5client’s needs are changing, or because most contracts are indeed incomplete [28,
42]. As a result, several firms have seen their outsourcers charge them high fees
for such new services or changes in the services rendered [13,22]. Sometimes,
requests for changes give rise to disputes, and even litigation. Disputes also occur
over the meaning of contractual terms: services to be rendered, service level,
personnel expertise, etc. At the time of contract renewal, other difficulties may
arise. An unsatisfied client may wish to repatriate the service. Yet, they may
encounter several difficulties in attempting to do so. Often, the required assets will
have been transferred to the outsourcer, along with the personnel who possessed
the expertise to conduct the outsourced activity. Not only can repatriation be very
costly [4]; in some occasions, it will be impossible [31]. The client might then
consider the alternative of transferring the service to another outsourcer. Yet, if the
number of suppliers is small, this might be an impossible alternative. Hence, the
lock-in problem [21,41,42].
Service quality and service costs are two major issues in IT outsourcing. The
literature provides numerous examples of degrading service levels resulting from
outsourcing: poor response time, poor turnaround time, late updates of software,
applications that do not meet the requirements, and so on. Often, parallel to service
degradation, service costs rise. For instance, one of the firms studied by Lacity and
Hirschheim indicated that their outsourcing costs were almost three time the costs
internal services.
The area of organizational competencies appears to be quite vulnerable in the
outsourcing context. Outsourcing deals almost always include IT personnel. The
very fact that no, or little, IT expertise remains in the firm is seen as dangerous,
since the firm will have lost its ability to use IT efficiently and effectively, and will
remain dependent on an external supplier. The ability to align IT with the firm’s
strategy might also be hampered, thus affecting the firm’s ability to maintain
competitive advantage, and to use IT in an innovative fashion [12, 13].
4. Risk factors
According to the risk definition provided earlier, undesirable outcomes are due to
risk factors. Table 2 presents a list of such factors identified from the literature. In
the context of outsourcing, transactions costs theory and agency theory are
particularly relevant to the risk factor identification exercise. Table 2 outlines the
risk factors according to the three key concepts of these two theoretical
frameworks (agent, principal, and transaction).
6Table 2
Risk factors in IT outsourcing
Agent Opportunism: moral hazard, adverse selection, imperfect
commitment
Lack of experience and expertise with the activity to be
outsourced
Lack of experience and expertise in managing outsourcing
contracts
Number of suppliers
Principal Lack of experience and expertise with the activity to be
outsourced
Lack of experience and expertise in managing outsourcing
contracts
Transaction Asset specificity
Uncertainty
Measurement problems
Frequency
Interdependence of activities
Proximity of core competencies
Technological discontinuity
Agency theory is concerned with the coordination and motivation issues that are
inherent in a relationship between a principal (the client) and an agent (the
outsourcer). An basic assumption of agency theory is that opportunism is an
inherent characteristic of such a relationship. Opportunism leads the principal or
the agent to seek their interest "with guile", to deviate from the behavior
prescribed by the contract whenever they benefit by doing so, "cheat", "shirk" or
"lie". This is not to say that principals and agents will always adopt an
opportunistic behavior. Moral codes, social norms, the risk of prosecution, and the
possible detrimental effects on reputation tend to limit the extent of opportunism.
Yet, these constraining factors do not prevent all opportunistic behavior [14, 37].
Opportunism is an important risk factor in an outsourcing contract. There are three
main manifestations of opportunism: moral hazard, adverse selection, and
imperfect commitment. Moral hazard results from the fact that it is impossible for a
principal to observe the behavior of the agent, without incurring prohibitive costs.
Since the client cannot directly observe the level of effort deployed by its supplier,
it cannot easily tell whether a problem is due to negligence on the part of its
supplier or to an unforeseeable event. Since the supplier knows the client cannot
7tell, the supplier can always blame poor performance on circumstances beyond its
control.
Adverse selection will develop when the principal cannot observe the
characteristics of the agent. The client must validate the suppliers’ claims, which
often is a difficult task. On the other hand, the supplier is often aware of this
difficulty. Failure to deal adequately with adverse selection will make it very
challenging for the client to choose the appropriate supplier. Sometimes the agent
truly believe that they actually have the required characteristics to adequately
perform the activity. In some circumstances, the supplier may commit an error of
overoptimism in evaluating its true capacity to fulfill its contractual obligations.
An excess of confidence will then lead him into a contractual agreement he, and
the client, will soon discover he cannot respect. Roll [36] has suggested that many
acquiring firms which accepted to pay huge premiums to a target were led by
managers with exaggerated beliefs in their capacity to "turn around" the target.
This is the "hubris hypothesis", from the Greek "Hubris", which means "over
exuberance".
Finally, imperfect commitment is the imperfect capacity of both the client and the
supplier to commit themselves. For instance, clients and outsourcers may be
tempted to renege on their promises and commitments. No contract is immune
from such behavior. A supplier will refuse to deliver the services or adapt
applications because, for instance, it claims that such adaptations had not been
foreseen, or because the language of the outsourcing contract is not clear.
Other characteristics of the agent constitute sources of risk. The lack of experience
and expertise of the agent with the outsourced activity is one of them [13]. It may
happen that a supplier, eager to obtain a contract, exaggerates the expertise it
possesses with certain activities. Lack of expertise may also occur over time. Since
several firms decide to outsource their legacy systems, vendors hire and retain IT
personnel who are familiar with older technology. When the client needs support with
new technology, the supplier might not have the required skills available. Another
risk factor is the lack of experience or expertise of the agent with the management of
outsourcing relationships, which could lead to disputes and to escalating costs.
Finally, the extent of competition among agents, which is often related to the number
of available vendors, is also a risk factor. A small number of vendors may bring about
the lock-in problem, since it will be difficult for the client to find alternative sources
of services [29].
The principal itself is a source of risk factors. In particular, Earl, and Lacity et al.
identify the lack of experience or expertise of the principal with the activity to be
outsourced as a major risk factor. These authors claim that while firms might be
tempted to outsource those activities that they do not do well, or that they do not
8understand well, going ahead with an outsourcing decision would lead to negative
outcomes. The lack of expertise with the outsourced activity may also have a negative
impact on the ability of the principal to adequately manage the contract, since they
will have difficulty in assessing the quality and the costs of the service rendered. As
was the case with the agent, the principal’s lack of experience and expertise with the
management of outsourcing contracts is another risk factor, since an inexperienced
principal is more likely underestimate transition and management costs, for instance
and be vulnerable to the agent’s opportunistic behavior.
Some characteristics of the transaction, that is, of the activity to be outsourced, are
important risk factors. Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset can be
redeployed without sacrificing its productive value if the contract is to be interrupted
or prematurely terminated. Because the "next best use" value of a specific asset is
much lower, the investor would loose part of its investment if the transaction was not
completed. This creates a lock-in situation where the other party (not investing) could
extract an advantage from the investor by threatening to withdraw from the
transaction [17, 41].
For a market to be efficient, parties must be able to predict with enough certainty the
activities to be performed in a contract and to measure the value of the elements
exchanged. This is often proven false. Transactions are conducted with a certain level
of uncertainty and are subject to measurement problems [1,6]. For example it may be
difficult to predict future user needs in a given project. Evaluating the adequacy of a
specific system delivered is also a arduous task, since system quality is difficult to
assess without extended use [30].
Frequency is another key dimension of a transaction. Organising a transaction within
the firm implies the creation of a governance structure. This generates important and
irreversible costs. If a transaction is known to be unique, these costs will likely be too
significant to allow for the integration of the activity within the firm. The firm will
prefer to bear the cost of the risks associated with investments or uncertainty rather
than invest in order to internalise a single transaction [41].
The degree of interdependence of the activities to be outsourced - or technological
indivisibility [13] - has also been identified as a one of the transaction characteristics
that constitutes a risk factor. According to Earl, outsourcing interdependent activities
may cause serious difficulties. Aubert [3] illustrates this type of problem with a
dispute over poor response time. The supplier in charge of computer operations
blamed the telecommunications firm for poor service, while the telecommunications
firm blamed the principal for not having the appropriate equipment, and the principal
put the blame on the outsourcer responsible for computer operations for not providing
good service. In such a situation, the real source of the problem might be very
difficult and costly to determine.
9Technological discontinuity is closely related to uncertainty, since it refers to one
aspect of the "volatility of the environment that cannot be anticipated" [29]. By
technological discontinuity, we mean technological changes and breakthroughs which
may make obsolete the technology which is was part of the contract. In the case of a
long term contract which specifies a certain type of technology, transferring to the
new technology may incur additional, prohibitive costs. On the other hand, if the
client does not adopt the new technology, and its competitors do, reduced
competitiveness might result.
Finally, proximity to core competencies is also a risk factor, the presence of which
may lead to undesirable consequences. Outsourcing an activity that is close to the
core competencies of the organization presents risks [33]. Fine and Whitney [15]
detailed the risks of dependency that were associated with that behavior. When
handing out these activities to a supplier, the organization risks that the suppliers
will either supplant the client in its own domain, or move in directions different
from the ones the client might have chosen. Organizations also must keep the
learning associated to their core activities in-house. However, this is often not an
easy task since the core is not always a stable set. This analysis is linked to the
corporate coherence. Organization learning is facilitated when the organization is
centered around its essential capabilities. Outsourcing an activity at the core of the
organization might impede organizational learning and lower the competitiveness
of the organization [39].
5. Relationships between risk factors and undesirable outcomes
As mentioned earlier, all risk factors do not lead to all undesirable outcomes. Risk
assessment then requires that the link between a consequence and the risk factor(s)
leading to it be drawn. Table 3 summarizes those links. It should be noted that
only those factors that, from our review of the literature, appear to be the most
closely related to a given outcome are indicated in the Table.
Hidden transition and management costs are likely to be due to a lack of
experience and expertise of the principal with the outsourced activity. If the
principal does not have enough knowledge in the activity to provide the agent with
a complete description of the tasks to be performed and to clearly specify its
needs, it is probable that unexpected costs will be incurred during transition. Both
partners will discover the existence of gray areas in the definition of the activity,
once again adding to the original cost. In fact, many clients seem to be ignoring
the agency costs as defined by Jensen and Meckling [20]. Any principal giving
work to an agent will have to incur costs to supervise and monitor the agent. The
principal might have a difficult time doing so because the principal will lack
information about the agent’s activities. Acquiring this information is costly.
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Table 3
Links between undesirable consequences and risk factors
Undesirable consequences Risk factors
Unexpected transition and management
costs
• Lack of experience and expertise
of the principal with the activity
Lock-in • Specificity of the transaction
• Small number of suppliers
Costly contractual amendments • Uncertainty
• Technological discontinuity
Disputes and litigation • Measurement problems
• Lack of experience and expertise
of the principal and/or of the
agent with outsourcing contracts
Service debasement • Interdependence of activities
• Lack of experience and expertise
of the agent with the activity
• Supplier size
• Supplier financial stability
Increased costs of services • Opportunism of the agent
• Lack of experience and expertise
of the principal with contract
management
Loss of organizational competencies • Proximity of the core
competencies
A lock-in situation often results from specific investments that were made by the
supplier when the contract was first signed. At contract renewal time, if no other
supplier is ready to make specific investments, the client does not have other
alternatives but continue its relationship with the current supplier [21]. The
supplier can then increase its fees, because of this lack of alternatives. The lock-in
situation may also occur in an industry where there is only a small number of
suppliers. Once again, when time comes to renew the contract, the client does not
have many alternatives. The agent can then almost dictate the conditions of the
contract [41].
Costly contractual amendments are related to the level of uncertainty of the
outsourced activity. When requirements, quality criteria, service levels and so on
are not well defined, the client is likely to ask for adjustments. Contracts have to
be reopened and modified. Such modifications are often mandatory for the conduct
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of the principal’s business. Contract modifications often bring about costs.
Technological discontinuity is another source of contractual amendments. Since
very few contracts make it mandatory for a supplier to respond to unforeseen
technological changes, it is likely that the client will have to pay quite a high
premium when these changes actually occur [32].
Service debasement may result from several risk factors. Interdependence between
an outsourced activity and activities which remained inside the firm is one of
them. When an activity is outsourced, it is expected that the fact that it is
performed outside the firm’s boundaries will not have negative consequences on
those activities that remain inside the organization. Once the activity is outsourced
though, the firm may realize that there were indeed dependencies between
activities, and that the conduct of the firm’s business is perturbed. This is linked to
the systemic nature of some activities [24]. The lack of experience and expertise of
the agent with the activity may also be a cause of poor service quality. Also, it may
happen that the supplier does not have the necessary resources, either because of
its size or financial situation, to devote to the activity, in order to ensure an
appropriate level of service.
Increased costs of services may be due to the agent’s opportunistic behavior. The
agent may me tempted to overcharge for the activities performed in order to obtain
a higher profit from the relationship. The agent’s opportunistic behavior is still
more likely, and its impacts more important, if the principal lacks experience and
expertise with the management of outsourcing contracts [22].
Learning about an activity and the acquisition of expertise and experience with the
conduct of the activity most often come with the conduct of this activity. When the
activity is outsourced, the firm is likely to lose some of its expertise. If the activity
is not close to the core competencies of the organization, the consequences are not
necessarily dramatic. However, if it is close to the firm’s core competencies,
outsourcing may even reduce the organization’s ability to do business [33].
6.  Discussion and conclusions
The notion of risk is present in the majority of articles published on
outsourcing. Up to now, though, very little had been done with respect to
providing the elements of a conceptual definition. This paper represents a first step
in this direction. The approach adopted for doing so is a "factor" approach, in that
it identified the main factors that may lead to undesirable consequences of
outsourcing. Much remains to be done to improve the proposed lists and to
develop an appropriate measure of risk. Case studies and Delphi studies may be
conducted in order to provide a first validation of the lists and to add to them.
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